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Abstract
This paper investigates the asset pricing implications of investor disagreement
about the likelihood of a systematic disaster. I specify a general equilibrium model
with multiple trees and heterogeneous beliefs about rare event risk, to understand
how risk-sharing mechanisms affect equity and variance risk premia, at an aggregate
level and in the cross-section of stock returns. I identify a state-dependent link
between equity and variance premia, that changes with the distribution of agent
consumption. Empirically, as in the model, the variance premium’s predictive power
for future excess returns is greater during times of financial distress, mainly for small
stocks.
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1 Introduction
Since the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008, tail or disaster risk—understood
as the potential presence of infrequent adverse events of extreme magnitude—has been
a concern for academics and investors alike. For instance, Hoang Le Huy, head of fixed
income and event strategies at Schroders NewFinance Capital, a London-based fund of
funds states: “You need to hedge against disaster scenarios. Black swan events are at
the forefront for a lot of investors right now. It is not something that people take lightly.
A lot of tail risk funds were built on the back of the 2008 disaster.”1 Numerous studies
show that even a small probability of an extreme event in economic fundamentals can
have significant effects on asset prices. These extreme events are rare by definition and so
accurately estimating their likelihood is difficult, which is a natural source of investor dis-
agreement over perceived tail risk. Such heterogeneity of beliefs about disasters suggests
that belief-driven risk sharing could explain the pricing of rare event risk. Compensation
for disaster risk contributes to a significant fraction of expected returns on equity and
pure variance positions. Thus, a better understanding of disaster risk premia should help
explain the dynamics of equity and variance risk premia and the nature of their comove-
ment. This paper studies, both theoretically and empirically, how agent disagreement
about disaster risk affects excess return dynamics and the relation between the equity
and the variance risk premia both for the market portfolio and the cross section of stocks.
I develop a general equilibrium Lucas (1978) economy with multiple assets and het-
erogeneous beliefs in which the premia for equity and variance positions and their co-
movement are endogenously driven by investor disagreement and the cross-sectional dis-
tribution of consumption. The model suggests a stronger predictive power of variance
risk premium for future excess returns in periods during which pessimists have a rela-
tively large consumption share—that is, in bad states of the economy, which are also
characterized by higher (absolute) values of the variance risk premium. Accordingly, I
find empirically that variance risk premia and their predictive power for future excess
returns are concentrated in phases of substantial disagreement among investors. In these
phases, regression coefficients and R2 are particularly large for small stocks, whose re-
1See Risk.net.
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turns are more dependent on the compensation for systematic rare event risk. Therefore,
exposure to aggregate variance risk could partially explain the size effect (i.e. the ob-
servation that smaller firms have higher returns on average), which actually seems to be
most pronounced during periods in which pessimists hold a large fraction of the aggregate
endowment. The time variation in the sign and strength of the predictive power of the
aggregate variance premium—both for future excess market returns and for individual
stocks—is a challenge for existing consumption-based asset pricing models. The model I
posit addresses these empirical challenges, and I provide a structural explanation based
on the role of risk sharing between agents who disagree.
The main ingredients of the model are the following. First, I consider an endowment
economy with a single consumption good but multiple trees.2 The endowment processes
follow a geometric Brownian motion with the addition of idiosyncratic and systematic
jump components. The presence of multiple trees allows me to study the relation between
equity premia in the cross section and the aggregate variance premium, together with the
determinants of comovement between trees. Second, two groups of investors, who have
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences over consumption, have different be-
liefs about the likelihood of a rare systematic event. Disagreement is an important source
of non continuous variation in the variance risk premium dynamics. The observed market
variance premium is, in fact, highly time varying; periods of small and smooth premium
alternate with periods in which the variance premium is larger (in absolute value) and
more volatile. The presence of disagreement about the intensity of disasters also allows
the variance risk premium to switch sign in certain phases, mainly for small individual
stocks; such switching is consistent with the empirical evidence. Third, I assume that the
intensity of the systematic jump process is time varying and proportional to an exogenous
state variable that can be interpreted as a continuous signal reflecting the state of the
economy. The two agents disagree on the coefficient of proportionality, so that the abso-
lute difference in perceived expected growth rates is also proportional to the exogenous
state variable and never switches sign. This simple specification of disagreement can be
considered as a reduced-form way to capture several empirical regularities of differences
in opinion which have been recently documented.
2In this context, trees are assets and a collection of trees is an orchard. See e.g. Martin (2013).
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Borrowing from the solution methods proposed for the Lucas Orchard by Martin
(2013) and from methods used in the single-asset difference in beliefs model of Chen,
Joslin, and Tran (2012), I derive semi-closed-form expressions for the stock prices in my
multiple trees economy with heterogeneous beliefs. Price-dividend ratios of individual
stocks and parameters in the price process dynamics depend on the consumption share of
the two agents, on the state variable driving time-varying intensities, and on the dividend
share distribution.
Using the model solution, I derive a number of predictions. First, the equity (vari-
ance) risk premium of an individual stock tends to increase (decrease) with its dividend
share and with the consumption share of the pessimistic agent; these phenomena can
be explained by the risk-sharing behavior of disagreeing investors. Moreover, as noted
above, the variance risk premium can switch sign—in particular for small stocks—when
optimists consume a large fraction of the aggregate endowment and disagreement is large
enough. In line with the data, the variance premium is time varying; it alternates phases
of small and smooth premia with periods in which the variance premium is larger (in ab-
solute value) and more volatile, where the change in regime is driven by an abrupt change
in the cross-sectional distribution of agent consumption. Second, the model-implied cor-
relation risk premium inherits these features because, consistently with the empirical
findings of Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2012), the index variance risk premium is
largely due to a covariance premium, mainly when assets are relatively evenly distributed
or the number of stocks in the economy is large. While the cross-sectional distribution of
agent consumption mainly affects the risk-neutral stock return correlation, the physical
correlation is relatively insensitive to it, which leads to a countercyclical correlation risk
premium. Third, rare event risk implies a tight link between the equity and the variance
risk premia, both for the market and for the cross section of stock returns. This link
provides the basic intuition for the role of the variance premium in predicting future
excess returns. However, standard predictive regressions imply an unconditionally linear
relation between equity and variance risk premia, whereas in the model the regression
coefficients are stochastic and depend on the asset’s dividend share and the agents’ con-
sumption share. I show by simulation that the aggregate variance premium’s power to
predict future excess returns is stronger when the consumption share of the pessimist is
4
larger, i.e., in bad states of the economy. At a disaggregate level, the predictive power
of the variance risk premium is especially large for small stocks. Fourth, I consider the
special case of a large diversified economy in which the number of stocks approaches
infinity and all stocks have the same dividend share, which approaches zero. In this case,
only systematic risk is priced and the relation between equity and variance risk premia
is conditionally linear. Moreover, infinitely small assets still earn a risk premium owing
to the presence of systematic rare event risk.
The empirical validity of the model’s main predictions is studied using the aggregate
S&P500 composite index as a proxy for the aggregate market and the return time series
of CRSP cap-based portfolio returns to analyze the differential effects of small versus big
stocks, based on monthly data from January 1990 through December 2011. The empirical
evidence confirms that the index variance premium’s ability to predict future excess
returns is (a) time varying for the market and for single stocks or stock portfolios and
(b) stronger during periods of financial distress. Such periods are characterized by large
(absolute) variance premia and substantial investor disagreement, which is proxied by the
dispersion in one-year-ahead forecasts of real GDP growth from the BlueChip Economic
Indicator. The predictive power of the variance premium is stronger (on average) for
small stocks, which have returns that depend more on the compensation for systematic
rare event risk. For example, the adjusted R2 of a standard predictive regression of
excess six-month returns on the aggregate variance premium is about 63% larger for
the small-cap portfolio than for big caps. The difference between small- and big-cap
portfolios is particularly evident in periods of high disagreement. Intuitively, investors
will require higher return from assets that are more sensitive to systematic disaster risk.3
However, this reasoning holds only when the perceived premium for systematic jumps
is sufficiently large. The model suggests that the systematic jump premium component
can even have a negative effect on a stock’s excess returns if the pessimists’ consumption
share is low enough. Thus the size premium could move in opposite directions depending
on what agent type dominates the market. This finding is consistent with the mixed
3The empirical literature on the size premium identifies several reasons why small stocks are more
sensitive to systematic risk. One possible explanation is that small firms are more affected by tight credit
conditions.
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results reported in the empirical literature on size premia.
This paper is related to several different strands of the literature. The first is the
growing research on asset pricing with multiple trees. Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-
Clara (2008) highlight the asset pricing implications of a two-trees Lucas (1978) economy
with a log-utility representative investor. Martin (2013) introduces multiple Lucas trees
(Lucas orchard) following jump-diffusion processes and a representative agent with power
utility. Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2014b) specify a diffusive two-trees model with
heterogeneity in beliefs; they characterize the relation between the difference in opinions,
volatility and correlation risk premia of index and individual options. In contrast to pre-
vious papers, I specify a collection of Lucas trees with rare disasters and heterogeneous
beliefs about the intensity of systematic rare events, with the goal of studying the im-
plications for equilibrium risk premia and for the relation between the market variance
risk premia and excess returns. Multiple trees allow me to analyze the contribution of a
premium for covariance risk to this predictive relation. This insight is motivated by the
empirical evidence in Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2012) that the index variance risk
premium is largely due to the high price of correlation risk and that option-implied corre-
lations have remarkable predictive power for future stock market returns. In my model,
covariance risk can contribute to a large fraction of the aggregate variance premium when
the economy is dominated by pessimistic agents. In such states, fear of systematic disas-
ters requires large compensation for both equity and variance risks, leading to a strong
comovement between equity and variance risk premia.
The predictive relation between the market variance risk premium and excess returns
was first observed by Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), who provide empirical evi-
dence that the variance risk premium accounts for a nontrivial fraction of the time-series
variation in post-1990 aggregate stock market returns at short horizons. They motivate
this link theoretically in a long-run risk model with stochastic volatility of consumption
growth volatility. In such models, recursive preferences are crucial to generate a pre-
mium for stochastic volatility of consumption growth volatility, which then drives both
the equity and variance risk premia. Yet, Wu (2012) observes that there is no empir-
ical correlation between the variance risk premium and the volatility of consumption
growth volatility. Moreover, Bollerslev and Todorov (2011) find that more than half of
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the variance risk premium is driven by disaster risk and suggest that equilibrium-based
asset pricing models should accommodate large and time-varying compensation for rare
disasters. The idea that the possibility of sudden downward jumps in the endowment
may help explain the equity premium puzzle dates back to Rietz (1988). More recently,
Gabaix (2012) and Wachter (2013) resolve several asset pricing puzzles by including a
time-varying risk of disasters in otherwise standard models. The literature on rare disas-
ters does not seek to explain the variance risk premium’s puzzling dynamics or its ability
to predict future excess returns. This paper seeks to fill that gap starting from a general
equilibrium model in which two sets of agents have different beliefs about the probability
of a disaster occurring.
Previous papers have studied the disagreement that surrounds assessments of disas-
ter risk. Dieckmann (2011) provides an equilibrium model in which log-utility investors
have heterogeneous beliefs about the likelihood of rare events; he explores the asset pric-
ing implications of this setup in an incomplete capital market as well as the effects of
market completion. Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) consider a complete market setting
and assume that two CRRA agents disagree about rare event risk. They show that the
relation between the disaster risk premium and the extent of disagreement about disaster
risk is highly nonlinear; a small proportion of optimistic investors can greatly attenuate
the impact of disaster risk on stock prices. I contribute to this literature along several
dimensions. First, I study the effects of disagreement on variance risk premia and its
predictive power for excess returns. Second, using the multiple trees setting I study the
cross-sectional implications of heterogeneous rare event risk. Third, I test empirically the
model’s main predictions. Finally, I use a specification of disagreement that is consistent
with several empirical regularities of differences in opinion. Patton and Timmermann
(2010) and Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2014a) show that differences in beliefs are
highly time varying and countercyclical. Moreover, Patton and Timmermann (2010) sug-
gest that there is a strong negative correlation between dispersion and consensus forecast
on GDP growth. They also find that forecasters’ view are persistent—in other words,
they tend to be consistently optimistic or pessimistic. In my model, disagreement is coun-
tercyclical whereas the average belief about expected consumption growth is procyclical;
these dynamics lead to a perfect negative correlation between consensus and dispersion,
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whose persistence is guaranteed by a positive exogenous state variable.
Finally, my results on the connection between the cross section of excess stock returns
and the aggregate variance premium are related to the literature on the size effect. Lem-
mon and Portniaguina (2006) demonstrate a negative relation between the size premium
and consumer confidence. In fact, the size effect (whereby smaller firms have higher
returns on average) seems to be concentrated in periods characterized by large disagree-
ment. Intuitively, investors tend to require higher returns from assets that are more
sensitive to systematic disaster risk. This intuition is well explained by Jagannathan and
Wang (1996), who argue that the market beta of firms with a greater likelihood of finan-
cial distress (e.g., small firms) is more sensitive to changes in the business cycle. Investor
sentiment is thus related to time variation in the expected returns of those firms because
such sentiment forecasts future business conditions. However, this reasoning holds only
when the perceived systematic jump premium is high. My model indicates that the jump
premium component can actually have a negative effect on the stock’s excess returns if
the consumption share of the pessimists is sufficiently low. Therefore, the size premium
can move in opposite directions, depending on which agent type dominates the market,
consistently with the mixed results of the later empirical research on the size effect.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic model
setup as well as the optimal consumption allocation, market prices of risk, and equilib-
rium market prices. Section 3 analyzes the properties of the equity and variance risk
premia, of their relationship, and the correlation risk premium. It also studies the case
of an infinitely large and diversified economy. Section 4 describes the data and provides
empirical support for the main model implications, while Section 5 concludes. All proofs
can be found in the Supplemental Appendix.
4See e.g. Crain (2011) for a review of the size effect.
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2 An Economy with Multiple Trees and Heteroge-
neous Beliefs about Systematic Disasters
This section introduces the model, which is a simple, continuous-time generalization of
the standard Lucas (1978) endowment economy. The model incorporates rare disasters
and heterogeneous beliefs about the probability of a common jump in N Lucas trees. For
notational convenience, vectors and matrices are denoted by bold symbols.
Two agents (i = A,B) observe the dividend stream produced by each tree, Dj, with
the following exogenous dynamics:
dDj(t)
Dj(t)
= µjdt+ σjdWjt + kjdNjt + kjdNct, j = 1, . . . , N, (1)
where Wt = (W1t,W2t, . . . ,WNt)
′ is an N -dimensional standard Brownian motion driv-
ing regular economic risk, rare event risk enters through the Poisson processes Nt =
(N1t, N2t, . . . , NNt)
′ and Nct with respective intensities λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λN)′ and λc(t).
Thus each stock has both an idiosyncratic and a systematic event risk component.
Namely, the jump in the dividend growth of stock j is idiosyncratic if driven by a jump
in Njt whereas jumps in Nct are common to all stocks. For simplicity, and since the goal
is to understand the asset pricing implications of heterogeneous beliefs on the probability
of a common jump, I assume that the intensity of the systematic Poisson process is time
varying5 while all other parameters, including the idiosyncratic jump intensities, are con-
stant. Furthermore, the coefficients µj, σj, kj, and λj—which represent, respectively, the
expected growth rate and volatility of dividend growth without jumps, the jump size, and
the idiosyncratic jump intensity—are assumed to be identical for all trees in the economy
(hence I will suppress their subscript j). The jump size k is restricted to be negative and
strictly less than 1 in absolute value; this ensures that dividend processes are positive.6
To focus on the effects of heterogeneous systematic rare event risk on risk premia, I
5Wachter (2013), among others, underlies the importance of taking into account time variation in the
probability of rare disasters to help explain, e.g., time variation in the equity premium and the excess
volatility puzzle, while Berkman, Jacobsen, and Lee (2011) provide empirical support for time-varying
rare disaster intensity.
6The assumption of constant jump size could be relaxed, but it helps to maintain tractability and to
isolate the effect of disagreement about rare event intensity.
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assume that agent beliefs differ only with respect to the systematic rare event intensity
λc(t), which is a function of an exogenous affine state variable X(t). In particular, agent
i believes that the common jump frequency is given by7
λic(t) = β
iX(t), (2)
for i = A,B, where X(t) follows a CIR process,
dX(t) = ϕ[1−X(t)]dt+ σX
√
X(t)dWXt , (3)
for WXt a standard Brownian motion that is independent of Wt. This assumption ensures
positivity of the intensity of a common jump under each agent’s beliefs, which also follows
a CIR process.8 I assume that the long-term mean of X is equal to 1, so that βi represents
the expected systematic rare event intensity perceived by agent i.
The probability measures of the two agents are equivalent because they agree on
null sets. Hence, their Radon–Nikodym derivative φ(t) = dPB/dPA exists and has the
following dynamics (see Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2010)):
dφ(t)
φ(t)
= (βA − βB)X(t)dt+
[
βB
βA
− 1
]
dNct. (4)
If the agents observe a common jump (i.e. if dNct = 1) then the likelihood ratio jumps by a
factor of βB/βA. If agent B is optimistic—which means he believes that the probability
of a systematic (negative) jump is lower (i.e., βB < βA, as I assume throughout the
paper)—then φ jumps downward in response to a systematic disaster. The absence of
systematic jumps over a period of time instead is more consistent with the optimist’s
beliefs and so the likelihood ratio increases deterministically at a rate λAc − λBc . Note
that, even in the case of constant systematic rare event intensity (i.e., X constant) the
state variable φ varies over time and decreases dramatically following a disaster.
7Benzoni, Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege (2012) assume a similar dynamics for a country’s
default intensity and use a β parameter that depends on the state of the world. They then employ
learning to capture contagion effects in the perceived default intensities of different countries.
8Wachter (2013) and Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) also assume CIR processes for the rare event
intensity. Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) include disagreement directly in the long-run average jump
intensity whereas here the proportionality coefficient βi is used to introduce disagreement.
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2.1 Dividend shares and consumption dynamics
I consider an endowment economy in which all trees produce the same perishable con-
sumption good; therefore, aggregate consumption equals the sum of all dividends, i.e.
C(t) =
∑N
j=1Dj(t). Let sj be the share of consumption contributed by stock j, i.e.
sj =
Dj(t)
C(t)
. An application of Itoˆ’s lemma to Equation (1) gives its dynamics:
dsj = σ
2sj
(
N∑
i=1
s2i − sj
)
dt+σsj
(
dWjt −
N∑
i=1
sidWit
)
+sj
k(1− sj)
ksj + 1
dNjt−sj
∑
i 6=j
ksi
ksi + 1
dNit.
(5)
Intuitively, the dividend share of asset j increases when there is a positive Brownian shock
to its dividend growth dynamics or an idiosyncratic disaster involving any of the other
dividend processes. Systematic jumps do not affect dividend share dynamics because such
jumps are assumed to have the same impact on all dividend processes. By construction,
the dividend shares sj sum to 1 and the N − 1 state variables sj for j = 2, . . . , N are
enough to describe the relative size of the N trees.9
From 1, the dynamics of aggregate consumption growth is given by
dC(t)
C(t)
= µdt+ σ
N∑
j=1
sjdWjt + k
N∑
j=1
sjdNjt + kdNct. (6)
Observe that even if agents agree on µ, the growth rate of consumption in normal times,
disagreement about the systematic rare event intensity leads to disagreement about the
total expected growth rate,
µiC = E
i
t
[
dC(t)
C(t)
]
= µ+ k(λ+ λic(t)). (7)
Here Eit(.) denotes conditional expectation under the probability measure Pi, which sum-
marizes agent i’s beliefs. Thus, the difference in expected growth rates can be expressed
in terms of the dispersion in beliefs,
µBC − µAC = k(λBc (t)− λAc (t)) = −k(βA − βB)X(t), (8)
9The drift in Equation (5) is zero when sj = 0, 1/N , or 1, and the dividend share distribution
is not stationary because one asset ultimately becomes dominant in the market; that is, dsj = 0 for
sj = 0, 1. This feature is shared by many of the literature’s general equilibrium models that involve two
or more trees. See for example Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-Clara (2008), who discuss properties of
the dividend share dynamics in the case of two trees.
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which is linear in the exogenous state variable X.
This simple specification of disagreement is a parsimonious way to capture several em-
pirical regularities of differences in opinion that have been reported recently. Patton and
Timmermann (2010) and Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2014a) show that differences in
beliefs are highly time varying and countercyclical. Moreover, Patton and Timmermann
(2010) suggest that (a) there is a strong negative correlation between belief dispersion
and a consensus forecast of GDP growth and (b) forecasters’ views tend to be consistently
optimistic or consistently pessimistic. In the model, disagreement is countercyclical if the
state variable X is interpreted as an exogenous continuous signal about the state of the
economy. The average belief as regards expected consumption growth is a decreasing
function of X, while the absolute difference in perceived expected growth rates is increas-
ing in X; the result is a perfect negative correlation between consensus forecast and the
dispersion in forecasters’ beliefs, the persistence of which is guaranteed by the positivity
of X.10
2.2 Agent optimization problem
Agents have a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility over consumption with finite
horizon T :
U i(Ci(t)) =
Ci(t)1−γ
1− γ (9)
for i = A,B; here γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, which is assumed to be
identical across agents.11 If we assume complete markets and use martingale techniques
(see e.g. Cox and Huang (1989)) then agent i’s optimization problem can be written in
10Disagreement could instead switch sign in the single-asset belief disagreement model of Chen, Joslin,
and Tran (2012), even if disaster intensities follow CIR processes, because disagreement is introduced
directly in the long-run average jump intensity.
11Dieckmann and Gallmeyer (2005) introduce heterogeneity only through different levels of relative
risk aversion and study equilibrium allocations. Chabakauri (2013) considers two trees and two CRRA
investors with heterogeneous risk aversions and portfolio constraints, and he examines the effects on
return correlations and volatilities. Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012) argue that combining heterogeneous
beliefs about disasters and different risk aversions can amplify the effects of risk sharing but does not
qualitatively change basic asset pricing results.
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static form as
J i = max
Ci
Ei
[∫ T
0
e−δtU i(Ci(t)) dt
]
, s.t. Ei
[∫ T
0
ηi(t)Ci(t) dt
]
≤ W i(0). (10)
Here δ is the time preference rate and ηi(t) is the state price density of agent i, whose
dynamics is given by
dηi(t)
ηi(t)
= −r(t)dt+
 N∑
j=1
(λ− λQj (t)) + (λic(t)− λQc (t))
 dt−θ(t)′dWt+ N∑
j=1
(
λQj (t)
λ
− 1
)
dNjt+
(
λQc (t)
λic(t)
− 1
)
dNct.
(11)
In this expression, the N -vector θ is the market price of regular economic risk associated
with Brownian motion W(t), while λQj and λ
Q
c are the risk-neutral rare event intensities
associated with the respective Poisson processes Nj(t) and Nc(t).
12 Agents are assumed
to be initially endowed with a fraction xis of each stock; that is, W
i(0) = xis
∑N
j=1 Sj(0).
The standard optimality condition now yields
Ci(t) = I i
(
yiηi(t)eδt
)
=
(
yiηi(t)eδt
)−1/γ
,
where I i(·) is the inverse marginal utility function of agent i and yi is the Lagrange
multiplier that solves the following budget constraint:
Ei
[∫ T
0
ηi(t)I i
(
yiηi(t)eδt
)
dt
]
= W i(0).
The equilibrium allocations can be characterized by solving the optimization problem
of a representative agent whose utility function is a weighted sum of the two agents’
utilities. Hence the planner’s problem (under PA, the pessimist’s probability measure) is
as follows:
J = max
CA,CB
EA
[∫ T
0
e−δt
(
CA(t)1−γ
1− γ + φ(t)
CB(t)1−γ
1− γ
)
dt
]
s.t. CA(t) + CB(t) = C(t),
(12)
where the weight φ is stochastic and is driven by the difference in beliefs.13 The equilib-
rium consumption allocations are obtained from the first-order condition of the represen-
12The market prices of diffusion and jump risk are not agent specific if the market is complete, since
the agents have to agree on the observed price paths, see e.g. Dieckmann (2011). Completeness of the
market is discussed in Section 2.3.
13The approach to formulating a representative agent problem with state-dependent weight was in-
troduced by Cuoco and He (1994); more recent examples can be found in Basak and Cuoco (1998) and
Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006). In a complete markets setting with heterogeneous beliefs the weight is
stochastic and equal to the Radon–Nikodym derivative φ(t) = dPB/dPA.
13
tative agent’s problem while using individual agents’ optimality conditions.
Proposition 1 Equilibrium consumption allocations are
CA(t) =
1
1 + φ(t)1/γ
C(t) and CB(t) =
φ(t)1/γ
1 + φ(t)1/γ
C(t), (13)
and investors’ state price densities are
ηA(t) = e−δt
(1 + φ(t)1/γ)γ
yAC(t)γ
and ηB(t) = ηA(t)
φ(0)
φ(t)
= e−δt
(1 + φ(t)1/γ)γ
yBC(t)γφ(t)
. (14)
Here φ(0) solves either agent’s individual budget constraint,14 and the stochastic weighting
process φ(t) = yAηA(t)/yBηB(t) follows the dynamics given in Equation (4) with jump
intensity λAc (t).
Proposition 1 characterizes the dependence of individual state price densities and
consumption policies on C and φ, which represent aggregate endowment and belief dis-
agreement risk in the economy, respectively. In this N -trees setting, the aggregate endow-
ment C depends on the exogenous single dividend growth processes and on the dividend
shares. Under homogeneous beliefs, the disagreement risk vanishes because φ is constant
and depends only on initial wealth: φ = (xBs /x
A
s )
γ. This means that, under homogeneous
beliefs, the investors who are initially more wealthy consume more in all future states and
times. In contrast, consumption differences can change sign if agents are heterogeneous.
Namely, if a systematic disaster occurs, the consumption share of the pessimist (agent
A) increases as φ jumps down.
For convenience, I define explicitly the consumption shares of the pessimistic and
optimistic agents as
cA(t) ≡ C
A(t)
C(t)
and cB(t) ≡ C
B(t)
C(t)
,
respectively. These shares will drive the market prices of risk and risk premia.
2.3 Price processes and market completeness
Assume the existence of a capital market that allows agents to share risk and finance con-
sumption. The market consists ofN risky assets with price vector S(t) = (S1(t), S2(t), . . . , SN(t))
′,
14The budget constraints of agents determine only the ratio yA/yB . I set yA = U ′(C(0), φ(0)) without
loss of generality, so that ηA(0) = ηB(0) = 1.
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each in unit net supply, as well as a riskless asset of price B(t) in zero net supply. Then,
for j = 1, . . . , N , the price process dynamics are as follows:
dSj(t) +Dj(t)dt
Sj(t)
= µSj(t)dt+ σSj(t)[dW
′
t dW
X
t ]
′ + kSj(t)dNt + k
c
Sj
(t)dNct, (15)
dB(t)
B(t)
= r(t)dt. (16)
The expected returns in normal times, µSj , the 1 × N + 1 vectors σSj of diffusion
volatilities, the 1×N vectors kSj of return jump sizes related to idiosyncratic jumps, the
return jump sizes related to systematic jumps, kcSj , and the riskless rate r, are determined
endogenously in equilibrium. However, with only N risky securities the market is incom-
plete, since they only span the uncertainty driven by the Brownian motions.15 Hence I
assume agents can also trade in N + 1 rare event insurance products Pj(t), j = 1, . . . , N
and Pc(t), which are in zero-net supply, do not pay dividends, and have price processes
dPj(t)
Pj(t)
= µpj(t)dt+ kpj(t)dNjt, (17)
dPc(t)
Pc(t)
= µpc(t)dt+ kpc(t)dNct, (18)
where µpj and µpc are determined in equilibrium, whereas jump sizes can be freely chosen
and need only be different from zero in order to complete the market. These assets can
be interpreted as insurance products against rare event risk because they do not contain
any continuous source of uncertainty. The buyer of asset Pj, j = 1, . . . , N, c, is rewarded
in the amount µpj every moment of time, but runs the risk that the asset’s value drops to
(1 + kpj)Pj when the corresponding Poisson process Njt jumps. Therefore, selling assets
Pj, j = 1, . . . , N , provides insurance against idiosyncratic jumps, while Pc is a form of
insurance against systematic disasters.16 In general, any set of N + 1 assets spanning all
jump components would complete the market, but the choice of disaster insurances is the
most appealing since it isolates the impact of the different rare events.
15More precisely, there are N + 1 Brownian shocks in the economy; however, the risk of changes in
the disaster probability (i.e., shocks to WXt ) are not priced in the power utility setting although they
would be if agents had recursive preferences. See also Wachter (2013).
16Catastrophe bonds can be viewed as the real-world counterpart to these theoretical securities.
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2.4 Market prices of risk
Market prices of risk are obtained by applying Itoˆ’s lemma to Equation (14) and then
comparing the resulting dynamics with Equation (11). They are summarized in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 The market prices of normal economic risk, both risk-neutral rare event
intensities, and the short rate are given by
θj(t) = γsjσ, (19)
λQj = λ(sjk + 1)
−γ, (20)
λQc (t) =
(
cA(t)λAc (t)
1/γ + cB(t)λBc (t)
1/γ
)γ
(k + 1)−γ, (21)
r(t) = δ + γµ− 1
2
γ(γ + 1)
N∑
j=1
s2jσ
2 − cB(t)(λAc (t)− λBc (t)) +
+
N∑
j=1
(λ− λQj (t)) + (λAc (t)− λQc (t)). (22)
The market price of economic risk has the standard solution as extended to the case
of N trees. The risk-neutral intensity λQj of an idiosyncratic jump in the dividend process
Dj depends only on the dividend share of asset j given that agents agree on the physical
idiosyncratic jump intensities. For any dividend share distribution, the idiosyncratic
jump risk premia λQj (t)/λ are constant and always greater than 1, and they tend to unity
as sj approaches zero. Thus the risk of idiosyncratic jumps in small assets is not priced,
and in general the price associated with idiosyncratic jump risk is small when the number
of stocks in the economy, N , is large. The risk-neutral common disaster frequency λQc
is a nonlinear function of the two agents common jump intensities weighted by their
consumption shares; it could be smaller than the physical intensity when the optimist’s
consumption share is large, leading to a systematic jump premium of less than 1. The
riskless interest rate follows the standard expression in Lucas economies with multiple
trees (see e.g. Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-Clara (2008)), with the addition of three
components related to disagreement and jump premia. The equilibrium short rate is
generally decreasing with the consumption share of the pessimistic agent A, as in the
aftermath of a disaster.
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Using Proposition 2, it is possible to derive explicitly the risk premia on the risky assets
once the volatilities and jump sizes of the stock price processes are known. This can be
done by applying Itoˆ’s lemma to the stock prices. For integer risk aversion γ, the resulting
equation can be solved in semi-closed-form as summarized in the next proposition.
Proposition 3 The price of stock j is given by
Sj(t) = E
A
t
[∫ T
t
ηA(s)
ηA(t)
Dj(s) ds
]
= Dj(t)gj(φ(t), X(t),u(t), t). (23)
Here the price-dividend ratio gj depends on time t, on the stochastic weighting process
φ, on the state variable X that drives time-varying systematic disaster intensity, and
on the dividend share distribution through the (N − 1)-dimensional state variable u =
(u2, . . . , uN)
′, with uj = ln
sj
s1
:
gj(φ,X,u, t) = e
−γ∑Nj=2 uj/N (1 + eu2 + · · ·+ euN )γ
γ∑
k=0
ak(φ)
∫
FNγ (z)eiu
′zbjk(X, t, z) dz,
(24)
where the integral is evaluated on RN−1, FNγ (z) is given in the Supplemental Appendix
and
ak(φ) =
(
γ
k
)
φ(t)k/γ
(1 + φ(t)1/γ)γ
,
bjk(X, t, z) =
∫ T
t
e(τ−t)[−δ+(µ−
1
2σ
2)1′N (ej−γ/N+iU′z)+ 12σ2(ej−γ/N+iU′z)′(ej−γ/N+iU′z)]+αN0,k(τ−t)+αN2,k(τ−t)X(t) dτ.
Here ej is the N-vector with a 1 in the jth entry and 0s elsewhere, 1N is an N-
dimensional vector of 1s and αN0,k(τ) and α
N
2,k(τ) satisfy the system of Riccati equations
given in the Supplemental Appendix.
Semi-closed-form expressions17 for diffusion volatilities and jump sizes of stock j’s
return process follow after application of Itoˆ’s lemma for jump-diffusion processes, using
dividend growth, stochastic weight process, dividend shares and exogenous state variable
dynamics:
σSj(t) =
[
σ
(
e′j +
g′ju
gj
U
)
gjX
gj
σX
√
X(t)
]
, kcSj(t) = (k + 1)
gj
(
φβ
B
βA
, X,u, t
)
gj(φ,X,u, t)
− 1.
(25)
17Up to the solution of the ordinary differential equations for α0,k(τ) and α2,k(τ), which is easily
obtained numerically after evaluating an (N − 1)-dimensional integral that is well-behaved but can be
computationally intensive for large N .
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The ith component of vector kSj(t) is given by
kSj ,i(t) =

gj(φ,X,u+ln(k+1)Uei,t)
gj(φ,X,u,t)
− 1 if i 6= j,
(k + 1)
gj(φ,X,u+ln(k+1)Uei,t)
gj(φ,X,u,t)
− 1 if i = j,
(26)
where U is a (N − 1)×N matrix:
U ≡

−1 1 0 · · · 0
−1 0 1 . . . ...
...
...
. . .
. . . 0
−1 0 · · · 0 1
 ,
and gju and gjX are the derivatives of the price-dividend ratio gj with respect to u and
X, respectively, which can also be obtained in semi-closed form. Time-varying disaster
risk and disagreement endogenously generate time variation in the diffusion volatilities
and jump sizes of stock returns, even if the parameters in the dividend growth processes
are constant.
3 Results and Analysis
In this section I study the properties of the risk premia and other asset pricing implications
of the model presented in Section 2. I analyze its main qualitative implications and the
mechanisms behind them by means of a simple numerical illustration for a symmetric
economy with two stocks, N = 2. In the baseline calibration, dividend growth processes
have a drift µ = 2.5% and a diffusion volatility σ = 5%.18 Rare events have an impact
of k = −0.41, consistently with the estimates reported in Dieckmann and Gallmeyer
(2005) and in Barro (2006).19 Idiosyncratic jumps have a constant intensity λ = 1% and
systematic jumps occur with a long-term frequency βA = 1%, so jumps in individual
dividend processes occur on average each fifty years. The optimistic agent believes that
18The values for the diffusion component of the dividend dynamics, µ and σ, are within the ranges
considered in the literature. See, among others, Campbell (2003) and Cochrane, Longstaff, and Santa-
Clara (2008).
19This value is often criticised in the literature, but the results of this paper, at least qualitatively,
are not affected by this debate. The patterns that I document could be obtained also assuming a lower
jump size and a slightly higher jump intensity.
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the long-term mean of the frequency of systematic disasters is smaller than does the
pessimistic agent, i.e. βB = 0.01%. The two agents have the same CRRA preferences
along with a time horizon T of 50 years, a time preference rate δ = 4%, and a risk
aversion parameter γ = 4. The parameters of the X process are ϕ = 0.142 and σX = 0.05.
Preference parameters are taken from Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012), while the parameters
in the X process are chosen to match the properties of Chen, Joslin, and Tran (2012)’s
calibrated time-varying disaster intensity. Model parameters are summarized in Table 1.
3.1 Equity and variance risk premia
From agent i’s perspective, the risk premium for any security is defined as the difference
between the expected return under Pi and under the risk-neutral measure Q. I report risk
premia relative to agent A’s beliefs, PA. Define the cum-dividend instantaneous return
of stock j as
dRjt =
dSj(t) +Dj(t)dt
Sj(t)
.
The instantaneous conditional equity risk premium of the individual stock j, ERPj, is
thus
ERPjt = E
A
t (dRjt)− EQt (dRjt)
= γσ2
(
e′j +
g′ju
gj
U
)
s− λ
N∑
i=1
kSj ,i(t)(JPit − 1)− λAc (t)kcSj (t)(JPct − 1), (27)
where s = (s1, s2, . . . , sN)
′ is the vector of dividend shares, JPit = λ
Q
i (t)/λ is the
jump premium related to an idiosyncratic jump in the dividend growth of asset i, and
JPct = λ
Q
c (t)/λ
A
c (t) is the jump premium related to a common jump. The first term
in (27) is the compensation for diffusion risk; the other terms represent a premium for
bearing idiosyncratic and systematic disaster risk, respectively.
As mentioned in Section 2.4, the jump premium for idiosyncratic event risk, JPit =
(sik+ 1)
−γ, is always greater than 1 and it is also close to 1 for small stocks. We can use
Equation (21) to write the jump premium for systematic event risk as
JPct =
1 +
(
φ(t)β
B
βA
)1/γ
(1 + φ(t)1/γ)

γ
(k + 1)−γ = (kCA(t) + 1)
−γ, (28)
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where
kCA(t) =
(1 + φ(t)1/γ)(k + 1)
1 +
(
φ(t)β
B
βA
)1/γ − 1
is the size of the jump in equilibrium consumption of agent A in response to a systematic
disaster. This jump size varies depending on the level of disagreement and the consump-
tion share distribution, due to risk sharing between agents. Since agent B (the optimist)
thinks systematic disasters are highly unlikely, he is willing to give up consumption in
future systematic disaster states in exchange for higher consumption in all other future
states. This mechanism reduces the consumption loss of agent A in the event of a sys-
tematic disaster and lowers the corresponding jump risk premium. The more wealth the
optimist has, the more disaster insurance he is able to sell. So when the wealth share
of the optimist is high, consumption of agent A can even increase at a disaster. That
scenario would lead to a jump premium lower than 1–in other words, to a risk-neutral
intensity λQc lower than the physical intensity λ
A
c .
20 A higher level of relative risk aver-
sion γ would lead to a much faster rise in the systematic jump premium, although the
qualitative implications would remain unchanged.
Figure 1 shows the conditional instantaneous equity premium of stock 1 at time t = 0
and its components, as a function of the dividend share s1, for two possible values of the
initial wealth share of the pessimistic agent A (cA = 0.1 in the left panel and cA = 0.9 in
the right panel). The equity premium is first slightly decreasing and then increasing in the
dividend share of the asset; a pattern that is due to the behavior of the compensation for
diffusion risk (see Martin (2013)) and to the fact that the overall premium for idiosyncratic
risk is lower for intermediate values of the dividend share. Note that the compensation for
diffusion and idiosyncratic rare event risk does not change with the consumption share of
the two agents, since they disagree only with respect to the systematic disaster intensity.
The contribution to stock 1’s equity premium of its own idiosyncratic jump risk starts
20More precisely, the systematic jump premium is less than 1 when the ratio of the consumption
shares is large:
cB(t)
cA(t)
>
−k
k + 1−
(
βB
βA
)1/γ
if the disagreement is large enough, that is, if β
B
βA
< (k+ 1)γ . In the calibration this condition is satisfied
when the consumption share of the optimist, cB(t), is at least 60%.
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at zero but increases substantially with its dividend share, as the asset becomes more
systemic. The compensation due to idiosyncratic rare event risk in asset 2’s dividends is
small unless the second stock contributes to a large fraction of aggregate consumption.
On the other hand, the component of asset 1’s equity premium that is due to systematic
rare event risk is basically flat with the dividend share but depends on disagreement risk
and reflects risk sharing between agents. The compensation for systematic jump risk
is negative for small consumption shares of the pessimist but increases rapidly, and for
large values of cA that compensation accounts for a large fraction of the individual equity
premium (mainly when dividends are evenly distributed between the two stocks). This
effect is primarily driven by the jump premium for systematic disasters, JPc. Besides
the jump risk premia, the equity premium is also a function of the jump sizes of stock
returns kSj and k
c
Sj
, which depend on the dividend loss and on changes in the price-
dividend ratios, as shown in Equations (26) and (25). Under CRRA utility, the drop in
the risk-free rate following a systematic disaster can dominate the effect of a rising risk
premium, which would lead to a higher price-dividend ratio. This partially offsets the
drop in dividends, making the return less sensitive to systematic disasters. The variation
of systematic jump size in stock returns with the pessimist’s consumption share is stronger
for a small stock and depends crucially on the assumption of difference in beliefs. In fact,
if there is no disagreement then the systematic jump size kcSj is constant and equal to the
loss in dividend growth k.
In the same way, the instantaneous variance risk premium of stock j, V RPj, can be
computed as the difference between objective and risk-neutral expectations of the return
variance:
V RPjt = E
A
t [(dRjt)
2]− EQt [(dRjt)2]
= −λ
N∑
i=1
kSj ,i(t)
2(JPit − 1)− λAc (t)kcSj(t)2(JPct − 1). (29)
Given the assumption of constant dividend growth volatilities, the variance risk premium
depends only on the jump risk components. Yet empirical evidence reported in Bollerslev
and Todorov (2011) shows that compensation for rare events actually accounts for a
large fraction of variance risk premia. The instantaneous variance premium V RPj is
usually negative, as expected, but it can become positive when JPct < 1 and large
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enough to balance out the contribution of the idiosyncratic jump components, which is
always negative. The variance risk premium is negatively related to the systematic jump
premium: it decreases with agent A’s consumption share, and it is either decreasing or
hump-shaped with respect to a stock’s dividend share (depending on the value of the
calibrated parameters). As for the individual equity premium, the compensation due to
idiosyncratic rare event risk in asset 2’s dividends is nearly zero; however, the contribution
of idiosyncratic rare event risk in its own dividend process is increasing (in absolute value)
in the dividend share (see Figure 2).
The model relates the correlation between individual variance premia to the systematic
rare event risk. This systematic component is stronger when the consumption share of
the pessimist is higher. In the case of a two-stocks economy, the average model-implied
correlation between variance premia ranges from −0.4 (when the consumption share of
agent A is 10%) to about 0.75 (when the pessimist consumes 90% of the aggregate
dividend).
Now let me define the instantaneous return on the stock market index as the weighted
sum of all individual asset returns:21
dRt =
N∑
j=1
sjdRjt. (30)
The instantaneous equity premium on the index is then ERPt =
∑N
j=1 sj ERPjt and the
instantaneous index variance risk premium is given by
V RPt =
N∑
j=1
s2j V RPjt +
N∑
j=1
∑
i 6=j
sjsi CRPjit, (31)
where CRPjit = E
A
t [dRjtdRit]−EQt [dRjtdRit] is the premium associated with the covari-
ance between returns of assets j and i.
Figure 3 plots the instantaneous equity (upper panels) and variance (lower panels)
risk premium of the market, under agent A’s beliefs, as a function of the dividend share
of asset 1, s1, and their decomposition in terms of individual equity and variance premia
for different values of the consumption share of the pessimistic agent. The market equity
premium increases with the consumption share of the pessimist, and it is lower when
21The stock market index can also be viewed as a claim on the aggregate endowment C = D1+· · ·+DN .
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the two assets contribute in the same way to the aggregate dividend because the equity
premium of individual stocks grows more than linearly with the dividend share. The same
reasoning holds for the absolute value of the aggregate variance premium—which includes,
however, an additional component reflecting the priced covariance between stock returns.
The covariance premium can contribute to a large portion of the aggregate variance
premium when the economy is dominated by the pessimistic agent, mostly when the
number of assets increases and they are relatively evenly distributed.
Apart from the aggregate variance premium’s dependence on the relative dividend
and consumption shares, its dynamic properties are worth examining. I simulate 30-year
paths of the variance risk premium at a monthly frequency from the model while using
calibrated parameters for different values of the initial wealth share of the pessimistic
agent, cA. Table 2 shows that, as the consumption share of the pessimist increases, the
V RP is both larger (in absolute value) and more volatile. A systematic disaster induces
an upward jump in the consumption share of the pessimist. That leads to a downward
jump in the variance risk premium, which is then followed by more negative and volatile
premia. Despite the setting’s simplicity, the dynamics of model-implied premia resembles
the behavior of observed variance risk premia (see Section 4 and Figure 6), in which
periods of low and smooth premia seem to be followed by larger and more volatile values.
Empirically a regime switch often corresponds to the beginning of a crisis, so it could be
linked to a systematic jump in the endowment process.
3.2 Stock return correlation and correlation risk premium
From Equation (15), the instantaneous conditional correlation between returns of stock
i and stock j is given by
CorrAt (dRit, dRjt) =
σSi(t)σ
′
Sj
(t) + kSi(t)k
′
Sj
(t)λ+ kcSi(t)k
c
Sj
(t)λAc√
(σSi(t)σ
′
Si
(t) + kSi(t)k
′
Si
(t)λ+ kcSi(t)
2λAc )(σSj (t)σ
′
Sj
(t) + kSj (t)k
′
Sj
(t)λ+ kcSi(t)
2λAc )
.
(32)
The first panel in Figure 4 shows the conditional stock return correlation in a symmetric
economy with N = 2 stocks as a function of the first tree’s dividend share s1 and the
pessimistic investor’s consumption share cA while using the model parameters in Table 1.
A comparative statics analysis reveals that disagreement reduces stock return correlation
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on average and in particular when risk sharing is stronger—that is, when the consumption
shares of the two agents are similar. Overall, the correlation under the pessimistic agent’s
objective measure is relatively flat: it has values between 35% and 43% and an average
across all states of about 39%.
The correlation risk premium is defined as the difference between the instantaneous
conditional correlation computed under the physical and the risk-neutral measure,
CorrRPij,t = Corr
A
t (dRit, dRjt)− CorrQt (dRit, dRjt). (33)
Here the risk-neutral correlation is computed as in (32) but using the risk-neutral idiosyn-
cratic and systematic rare event intensities λQj and λ
Q
c , respectively (see second panel of
Figure 4). The model-implied risk-neutral correlation increases substantially with the
consumption share of the pessimistic agent and ranges approximately between 11% and
75%. This result is consistent with the empirical findings of Driessen, Maenhout, and
Vilkov (2012), who show that the implied correlation for the S&P500 is highly coun-
tercyclical and fluctuates between 0.2 and 0.8 for the period 1996–2010. The dynamics
of the risk-neutral correlation is almost entirely driven by disagreement between agents
about the probability of a systematic disaster. The average risk-neutral correlation for
the full model is about 46%, which corresponds to an average instantaneous correlation
risk premium of about −7%; this value, too, is consistent with the empirical findings
reported by Driessen, Maenhout, and Vilkov (2012). However, the model-implied corre-
lation premium (see third panel of Figure 4) can be much larger in absolute value when
the pessimist accounts for a large part of the aggregate consumption, and it can also
become positive when the pessimist’s consumption share is relatively low—mainly when
the dividend shares of the two assets are similar.
3.3 Relation between the equity and the variance risk premium
Comparing the expressions for the variance premium (see Equations (29) and (31)) with
those for the equity premium (Equation (27)) shows that rare event risk implies a tight
link between the two, both for the market and for the cross section of stock returns. This
link provides our basic intuition for the role of the variance premium in predicting future
excess returns, which is consistent with Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009)’s empirical
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finding that aggregate variance risk premium can explain a nontrivial fraction of the
time-series variation in post-1990 aggregate stock market returns. Premia that are high
(in absolute value) predict high future returns—though mainly over short horizons, when
the compensation for rare events accounts for a large portion of the empirical equity and
variance risk premia (see e.g. Bollerslev and Todorov (2011)). Yet standard predictive
regressions imply an unconditionally linear relation between equity and variance risk
premia, whereas the model’s relation is conditional on the information set at time t.
The idiosyncratic and systematic event risk components of the equity and variance risk
premium are linearly related, but the regression coefficients are stochastic and given
by the inverse of the corresponding jump size. Depending on which of the jump risk
components dominates, the relation can be either weaker or stronger. The importance
of the idiosyncratic and systematic rare event risk contribution to the risk premia, as
well as the jump sizes in stock returns, are both functions of the asset’s dividend share
and the agents’ consumption share. Thus, time variation in share distributions leads to
a time-varying relation between equity and variance risk premia, both at an aggregate
level and for individual stocks. For individual stocks, however, empirical estimates of the
variance premium are noisy owing to lack of reliable high-frequency data for computing
the realized variance. Moreover, there is evidence of a large systematic component in the
cross section of variance risk premia (see e.g. Carr and Wu (2009)). Hence this paper
explores the relation between the instantaneous equity premium of individual stocks and
the market’s variance risk premium.
To develop a better understanding of the model implications that concern the predic-
tive power of aggregate variance premium for market and individual stock excess returns,
I run regressions on simulated data. This involves simulating 30 years of monthly excess
stock and market returns and the instantaneous variance risk premium from the model
in Section 2 while assuming a symmetric economy with N = 2 stocks and using the base-
line model parameters. The purpose of these simulations is to investigate the model’s
qualitative implications for the interaction between the aggregate variance premium and
the excess stock and market returns. This is a natural step between the model and the
empirical evidence presented in Section 4. I consider return regressions of the form
rei,t+h = αi + βi V RPt + εi,t+h,
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where rei,t+h is the simulated log excess return of the two stocks (i = 1, 2) or of the market
(i = M) and where h is the return horizon in months. The excess return is given as an
annualized percentage and the variance premium is given as a monthly squared percentage
for consistency with the literature (see e.g. Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009) and
Drechsler (2013)). Table 3 reports the average regression coefficient and adjusted R2 (with
standard errors in parentheses) for the market at horizons h = 1, 6, and 12 months and
for different values of the initial consumption share of the pessimistic agent, cA = 0.1, 0.5
and 0.9. The predictive coefficient is generally negative. The predictive power increases
with the horizon and with the initial wealth share of the pessimistic agent, which is
also associated with larger (absolute) values of the variance risk premium and of its
volatility (again, see Table 2), and at 6 and 12 months horizon the regression coefficient
is significantly different from zero only when the pessimist holds a large fraction of the
aggregate endowment. Note that the average estimated regression coefficient is quite
close to what is found in the data (see Section 4), even if the model is not estimated or
calibrated to match the observed V RP moments.
Turning now to the cross section, the first two panels of Table 4 display results of the
same predictive regressions for the two individual stocks in the economy. Initially, the
small stock (Panel A) has dividend share s1 = 0.1 and the big stock (Panel B) has a share
s2 = 0.9. The regression coefficient for the small stock is often positive and not significant.
The reason is that, with only two stocks in the economy, the fear of idiosyncratic disasters
in the dividend growth of the large stock has a strong effect on the equity premium of
the small stock; the corresponding jump size in the small stock return, kS1,2(t), can be
positive and thereby lead to a weak positive relation between the equity premium of the
small stock and the market variance risk premium. This effect holds also after eliminating
idiosyncratic jump risk (λ = 0) for small values of the consumption share of the pessimist,
because in that case the variance risk premium of the small stock is negatively correlated
with the market variance premium. In contrast, the predictive regression results for the
large stock (Panel B) are in line with those discussed for the market return regression,
since the big stock contributes to a large fraction of the aggregate dividend.
An economy consisting only of two stocks, one of which accounts for 90% of aggre-
gate consumption, is clearly not realistic. It would be interesting to run cross-sectional
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predictive regressions for an economy with many assets and relatively small values of the
dividend share, since these features better characterize real-world markets. However, it is
not computationally feasible to simulate the model for large N because the solution would
require numerical evaluation of a high-dimensional integral at each time step. However,
Section 3.4 investigates theoretically the special case of a large and diversified economy
and demonstrates that, as N increases, the idiosyncratic jump premium contribution the
both equity and variance risk premia vanishes and the aggregate variance risk premium is
almost entirely driven by a covariance premium. So in order to mimic the case of a large
economy without the need to simulate it, I look at the predictive power of the simulated
covariance risk premium for the excess return of individual stocks. Panels C and D of
Table 4 display results of the regression
rei,t+h = αi + βi CRPt + εt+h,
where rei,t+h is the simulated log excess return of the small and the big stock and CRP
is the covariance risk premium (in monthly squared percentage). For the small asset
(Panel C), the predictive coefficient is negative and significantly different from zero. Its
average value is similar across horizons and consumption shares of the pessimist, but the
standard deviation of the regression coefficient decreases with cA leading to high adjusted
R2 when the pessimist accounts for a large share of aggregate consumption. On average,
the R2 values are even higher than those reported in Table 3 for the aggregate market.
At the 6-month horizon, for example, the average adjusted R2 for the regression of excess
small asset returns on the instantaneous covariance premium is almost 19%, as compared
with a 14% R2 for the regression of market excess returns on the variance premium.
For the large asset (Panel D), results are much weaker. Regression coefficients are even
positive for small values of the pessimist’s consumption share yet become negative (but
only marginally significant) for large cA. These results indicate that, in a relatively large
economy, the forecasting power of the aggregate variance risk premium for future excess
returns should be stronger for small stocks because their returns are more dependent on
the compensation for systematic rare event risk (though mainly for large values of the
consumption share of the pessimistic agent).
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3.4 The case of a large economy: N →∞
Let me now consider analytically the case in which the number of assets in the economy
approaches infinity and dividends are evenly distributed across assets; that is, sj = 1/N
for j = 1, . . . , N . In this case, the premium for idiosyncratic risk in individual assets
vanishes because JPjt = (k/N +1)
−γ converges to unity for all j. Moreover, the diffusion
component in the equity premium for stock j reduces to γσ2/N , which tends to zero as
the number of assets N increases. Hence the expressions for the equity risk premium of
stock j and of the index can be simplified as follows:
ERPjt = −λAc (t)kcSj(t)(JPct − 1), (34)
ERPt = γσ
2 − λAc (t)kcSj(t)(JPct − 1). (35)
The equity premium is the same for any stock because in this special case, kcSj(t) = k
c
Si
(t)
for all i and j. Furthermore, the market equity premium is equal to the equity premium
of single stocks plus the standard (constant) compensation for diffusion risk, γσ2, that
arises in economies where dividend growth follows a geometric Brownian motion. Note
that even if stocks are negligibly small, they still earn a risk premium due to the presence
of the systematic jump component, which does not depend on the dividend share (see
the black dashed-dotted lines in Figure 1).
Similarly, the variance risk premium is the same for any individual stock,
V RPjt = −λAc (t)kcS(t)2(JPct − 1), (36)
and is equal to the premium for the covariance between stock i and stock j, CRPjit =
V RPjt. Then the variance premium for the market index becomes
V RPt =
N∑
j=1
s2j V RPjt +
N∑
j=1
∑
i 6=j
sjsi CRPjit
=
V RPjt
N
+
N − 1
N
CRPjit
= −λAc (t)kcS(t)2(JPct − 1), (37)
which is equal to the variance risk premium of any individual stock and also to the
covariance premium. In particular, from the second line of Equation (37) it is evident
that, as N increases, all the market variance risk premium is due to a premium for
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covariance. In accordance with this model-implied feature, Driessen, Maenhout, and
Vilkov (2012) show empirically that the variance risk premium for the S&P500 index
can be largely attributed to the high price of correlation risk.
To clarify premia behavior in this special case as a function of the consumption share
distribution, Figure 5 shows the equity premium of stock j and of the index, the system-
atic jump premium, and the index variance risk premium as functions of the consumption
share of the pessimistic agent, cA.22 In this case the link between variance risk premia
and excess stock returns, both for the index and for single stocks, is straightforward:
ERPt = γσ
2 +
1
kcs(t)
V RPt, (38)
ERPjt =
1
kcs(t)
V RPt. (39)
and it is linear conditionally on the information set at time t. In particular, the regression
coefficient 1/kcs(t) depends only on the consumption share of the two agents. This relation
is negative and stronger for large values of the consumption share of the pessimist; the
maximum is around cA = 0.7, above which the relation becomes weaker for extreme
values of cA.
For a large and diversified index such as the S&P500, the model thus suggests a
stronger predictive power of variance risk premium for future excess returns in periods
during which pessimists have a relatively large consumption share—that is, in bad states
of the economy, which are also generally linked to higher (absolute) values of the variance
risk premium. I investigate this intuition empirically in Section 4.2.
3.5 Consumption share dynamics and survival
Agent survival is an important issue in complete markets models with heterogeneous be-
liefs and time-separable preferences (see e.g. Yan (2008) and Kogan, Ross, Wang, and
Westerfield (2006)). Under most models in which agents have identical CRRA prefer-
ences, only those agents whose beliefs are closest to the truth will survive in the long
22Numerical results are obtained for the parameters in Table 1 and N = 10, which is not that large
but already entails solving a 9-dimensional integral—even though in the special case of equal dividend
shares, the expression for the price-dividend ratio is simpler than in the general case in Section 2 (see
Supplemental Appendix). Nonetheless, already for N = 8 or 9 the results are nearly identical.
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run. If the irrational agent (optimist in the foregoing analysis) is quickly eliminated from
the economy then the price effects generated by trading between agents disappear. It
is therefore worth analyzing the survival of agents A and B, which is defined as their
asymptotic share of consumption as the horizon goes to infinity (see e.g. Berrada (2009)
and Dumas, Kurshev, and Uppal (2009)). Table 5 shows the mean and standard devia-
tion of the share of consumption of the optimistic agent, cB, at horizon T = 50, 100, and
500 years; these values are obtained from 1, 000 simulations starting from cB = 0.1, 0.5,
and 0.9. I find that the optimist can survive for long periods and that his consumption
share actually increases if there are no systematic disasters. Therefore, the risk-sharing
dynamics documented previously are not likely to disappear quickly.
The dynamics of the consumption share of the pessimistic agent is obtained by ap-
plying Itoˆ’s lemma to cA = (1 + φ(t)1/γ)−1 and using Equation (4):
dcA(t) = −1
γ
cA(t)cB(t)(βA − βB)X(t)dt+ cA(t)cB(t)
1−
(
βB
βA
)1/γ
cA(t) + cB(t)
(
βB
βA
)1/γ dNct. (40)
The drift is negative; thus cA declines deterministically when there is no systematic
disaster but increases in response to systematic disaster, and both effects are stronger as
the level of disagreement increases.
However, the consumption share’s distribution is not stationary, which means that at
infinite horizon one of the agents eventually disappears. Such nonstationarity could po-
tentially be an issue in light of an estimation of the model. Possible solutions are provided
by Borovicka (2012), who shows that recursive preference specifications lead to equilibria
in which both agents survive, and by Garleanu and Panageas (2015), who propose an
overlapping-generations framework to obtain a nondegenerate stationary equilibrium. I
leave extensions of the model in these directions to future research.
4 Empirical Analysis
This section briefly introduces the data before studying the empirical support of the main
model’s implications. In particular, I first analyze the link between equity and variance
risk premia at an aggregate level via predictive regressions of market excess returns on the
30
variance risk premium. Second, I investigate cross-sectional variations in the forecasting
power of the aggregate variance premium.
4.1 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the aggregate S&P500 composite index (a proxy for
the aggregate market portfolio) and on CRSP cap-based portfolios returns, to analyze
the differential effects of small versus big stocks. I use monthly data from January
1990 through December 2011 for a total of 264 monthly observations. Excess returns
are constructed by subtracting the log 30-day T-bill yield to the monthly returns, all
obtained from CRSP.
The variance risk premium for any asset is defined (see also Section 3.1) as the differ-
ence between physical and risk-neutral expectations of total return variance for a given
horizon. The Volatility Index (VIX), from the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE)
provides a model-free measure of the risk-neutral expectation of total market return vari-
ation over the subsequent 30 days and is based on the highly liquid S&P500 index
options.23 A measure of the realized variance of the market for a given month can be
obtained by summing up S&P500 squared five-minute log returns24 and I compute the
expectations under the physical measure of total stock market return variance by a sim-
ple projection of the realized variance measure on a set of predictor variables. As in
Drechsler (2013) and Drechsler and Yaron (2011), the realized variance is projected on
the value of the squared VIX at the end of the previous month and on a lagged realized
variance measure.25 The difference between the conditional forecast from the projections
and the risk-neutral expectation, measured using the VIX, yields the series of one-month
23The VIX is subject to some approximation error (see, e.g., the discussion in Jiang and Tian (2007)),
but relying on the squared VIX as a measure of the risk-neutral expected variance facilitates comparison
with other studies. The VIX is reported in terms of annualized percentage volatility, therefore I square
it and then divide by 12 to obtain a monthly quantity.
24I obtain a monthly time series of realized variance based on five-minute returns from Hao Zhou’s
webpage: https://sites.google.com/site/haozhouspersonalhomepage/.
25I also implement the same regressions using an expanding window to rule out any look-ahead bias.
Because the results are almost identical, I use the in-sample estimates to facilitate comparison with
existing studies and to avoid losing observations at the beginning of the sample for the initial estimation.
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market variance premium estimates plotted in Figure 6.26 The variance premium for the
market is negative on average, which means that investors are willing to pay a premium
to be insured against high-variance states; the premium is time varying, with periods of
a small and smooth premium alternating with periods in which the variance premium is
larger (in absolute value) and more volatile. These phases of high and volatile variance
premia seem to coincide with periods of large disagreement between investors, denoted
by the light gray shaded areas in Figure 6. Periods in which differences in beliefs are
large include recessions (denoted by dark gray shaded areas) and other times of financial
distress, such as the Long-Term Capital Management crisis and Russian default in 1998.
I study empirically the forecasting power of the market variance risk premium for both
the market excess return and cap-based portfolio returns.
Since the model-implied variance risk premium includes compensation only for jump
risk, as a robustness check I run the same predictive regressions using the time series of
market variance risk premium due to large jumps as computed by Bollerslev and Todorov
(2011), although data are available only for the period 1996–2007.27 Details on the data
and a summary of the results using this alternative measure of the variance risk premium
are provided in the Supplemental Appendix and are generally consistent with the results
discussed in this section.
Proxies of belief disagreement are calculated using the mean absolute deviation of one-
year-ahead forecasts on real GDP growth from the BlueChip Economic Indicator, which
are available at a monthly frequency through December 2009.28 Being consistent with the
model presented in Section 2 would normally require that I measure disagreement about
the perceived probability of a systematic disaster, but this is proportional to disagreement
26Similar dynamics are obtained when using more sophisticated models for the realized variance
forecasts, such as the heterogeneous autoregressive (HAR) model of Corsi (2009), but here I focus on
the simplest measure because more complex models are difficult to identify using monthly data. Bekaert
and Hoerova (2014) compare different volatility forecasting models and show that the projection I use
is the best within the simple specifications and also performs relatively well in comparison with more
sophisticated models.
27I thank Viktor Todorov for providing the data.
28See Buraschi and Whelan (2011) for details on the database, disagreement measures, seasonal
adjustment, and construction of forecasts at fixed one-year horizons. I am grateful to Andrea Vedolin
and Paul Whelan for providing the time series of belief disagreement on GDP growth.
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about the total expected consumption growth provided agents do agree on the expected
growth rate in normal times (see Equation (8)).
4.2 Predictive regressions for the market
The simple general equilibrium model in Section 2 implies a tight link between variance
risk premia and excess returns of the stock market index, which is consistent with the
empirical findings in Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), Drechsler (2013), and Drech-
sler and Yaron (2011). Panel A of Table 6 displays results from ordinary least-squares
(OLS) estimation of standard return predictability regressions of the form
ret+h = α + β V RPt + εt+h. (41)
I regress monthly S&P500 excess returns—at horizons h ranging from one month to one
year—on the variance risk premium. The excess return series for h > 1 are overlapping, t-
statistics are Newey–West corrected, and I report adjusted R2 in percentage. In line with
results reported in the literature, there is a negative and significant relation between
the variance premium and excess returns; also, the predictive power (measured either
as the adjusted R2 or as t-statistics of the regression coefficient) is highest at the six-
month horizon.29 Panel B reports results from robust regressions that employ Huber-type
weights to limit the influence of outliers. The robust regression estimates agree both in
magnitude and sign with the OLS estimates, and in most cases the predictability evidence
is even stronger.30 Overall, these results indicate a considerable ability of the variance
risk premium to predict future market excess returns.
Estimating the regression in Equation (41) however implicitly imposes major restric-
tions on the relation between variance risk premium and future returns, since that re-
gression assumes a monotone and linear structure. The theoretical asset pricing model
29Considering only the pre-crisis sample the R2 peaks at a quarterly horizon and the regression
coefficients become insignificant at long horizons; results are available upon request and are consistent
with those of Bollerslev, Tauchen, and Zhou (2009), whose sample ends in December 2007.
30A more naive way to control for the effect of outliers is to run the OLS regression without the two
potentially anomalous observations of October and November 2008 (at the peak of the financial crisis)
when the realized variance experienced unprecedented levels. Results do not qualitatively change, and
the estimates are just slightly more significant than in Panel A of Table 6.
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presented in Section 2 suggests that this relation is only conditionally linear; uncondi-
tionally the relation need not be linear or even monotonic. Therefore, I study empirically
potential instabilities or nonlinearities in the standard regression results. Introducing
additional regressors does not qualitatively change the results (as shown by Bollerslev,
Tauchen, and Zhou (2009)), so I rely on simple regressions to outline the properties of
the relation between returns and variance premia. I also focus on the six-month horizon,
for which significance of the standard predictive regressions seems to be stronger. The
regression coefficient β for a large market index should vary with the distribution of the
consumption share between agents (see Section 3.4). That distribution is not observable,
but in the model it is directly linked to the level and volatility of the variance risk pre-
mium (see Table 2); hence I investigate the shape of the predictive relation for different
levels of the premia.
First, I run regression (41) separately for different quantiles of the variance risk
premium. Figure 7 plots the distributions of regression coefficients (upper panel) and
R2 (lower panel), which are obtained by applying a block bootstrap procedure. In
both panels, the leftmost box plot corresponds to small absolute values of the premium
(V RP < q70%), the rightmost one to large values (V RP > q30%), and the middle box
plot to average values of the V RP . In accordance with the model, predictive power is
increasing in the (absolute) level of the variance premium and the regression coefficient is
significantly different from zero only for large values of the variance risk premium. From
an empirical standpoint, changes in the variance premium are of course not exclusively
related to changes in the cross-sectional consumption distribution of disagreeing agents.
In order to relate more tightly the instability of standard predictive regressions to the
extent of risk sharing among agents, I stratify regression (41) according to the level of
difference in beliefs (DB). Again, the regression coefficient increases in absolute value
with the level of DB, from −0.2415 to −0.9725; the adjusted R2 is 1.09% for small DB
and increases to 4.02% and 20.91% for average and large DB, respectively.31 The link
between the level of the variance premium and measures of disagreement is confirmed by
a simple OLS regression of monthly V RP on DB from January 1990 through December
31The values of the regression coefficients and R2 are not exactly comparable to the results obtained
previously because DB is available only until December 2009 (see Section 4.1).
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2009. A change of one standard deviation in DB yields a change of 0.38 standard devi-
ations in the variance premium; this result is strongly significant both statistically and
economically, with a Newey–West corrected t-statistic of −4.319 and an adjusted R2 of
about 14%.
A second way to analyze the validity of a simple linear regression is to estimate a fully
nonparametric regression of the form
ret+h = m(V RPt) + εt+h, (42)
where m: R → R is an arbitrary function fulfilling some smoothness conditions. An
estimate of the function m can be simply obtained by using the Nadaraya–Watson kernel
estimator with, in this univariate case, a Gaussian kernel; see Figure 8.32 The number of
observations is not large enough to draw strong conclusions, but a visual inspection clearly
confirms the absence of any link between the two variables for small (absolute) values of
the variance risk premia, although there is a stronger negative relation for more extreme
values of those premia. Hence this simple nonparametric analysis supports the conclusion
that the predictive power of variance risk premia for market returns is a time-varying and
nonlinear phenomenon.
To avoid a fully nonparametric procedure, it is possible to model explicitly the regres-
sion coefficient’s time variation. The conditional β could, for example, be a function of
the variance premium itself:
r˜et+h = (β0 + β1V˜ RP t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
βt
V˜ RP t + εt+h, (43)
where the tilde marks variables that are standardized. Equation (43) is equivalent to a
quadratic regression and can be estimated via standard OLS.33 If β1 proved to be in-
significant then we could not reject a linear relation between excess returns and lagged
variance premia, but β1 is actually both positive and significant whereas β0 (the linear
term) is insignificant; the adjusted R2 of this regression is 9.47%, which corresponds to
32The optimal bandwidth, computed as suggested by Bowman and Azzalini (1997), is 4.77.
33In other words, I am estimating Equation (42) while requiring that m be a quadratic function. One
could, theoretically, employ other functional forms, but this is the most obvious alternative to a linear
regression.
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a 22% increase over the linear regression’s adjusted R2 of 7.75% (at six-month horizon).
In general, time variation in the regression coefficient is modeled by introducing an inter-
action term. Apart from the level of V RP , other reasonable candidates worth exploring
are the volatility of V RP and the level of disagreement or optimism. If we use DB as
a conditioning variable, then the regression coefficient βt becomes more negative with
increasing disagreement (as expected), and the adjusted R2 for the monthly 1990–2009
sample increases from 6.3% to 7.6%.
An alternative way of analyzing the time variation in the predictive power of the
variance premium for future returns is to estimate a standard regression on a rolling
window. I regress market excess returns at a 6-month horizon on lagged variance risk
premium using a rolling window of 50 months. Figure 9 reports estimates of the slope
coefficient and corresponding adjusted R2. Instability of the predictive relation is evident,
and it is possible to relate the time variation in the slope coefficient to measures of
disagreement. The correlation between the rolling regression coefficient estimate and a
moving average of the difference in belief measure is equal to −51.18%, which means that
the regression coefficient becomes more negative as disagreement increases. The relation
between the regression’s slope coefficient and the difference in beliefs suggests that the
predictive power of variance risk premia for future excess returns is countercyclical, given
that measures of disagreement are known to increase in bad times (see e.g. Patton and
Timmermann (2010) and Buraschi, Trojani, and Vedolin (2014a)).
A growing body of empirical evidence documents instabilities and nonlinearities in
the strength of the return predictability by popular macroeconomic variables such as
the dividend yield and short rate variables. For example, Henkel, Martin, and Nardari
(2011) use a regime-switching model to show that standard aggregate return predictors
are effective during business cycle contractions but practically useless during expansions.
In the same way, I examine the dynamics in the predictive power of variance risk premia
via estimation of a regime-switching model:
r˜et+h = βs V˜ RP t + εs,t+1, (44)
where εs ∼ N(0, σ2s) and the state s ∈ {1, 2} follows a Markov chain with constant
transition probabilities. I find that predictability is present only in state 2, which is char-
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acterized by more volatile and larger (on average, in absolute value) variance risk premia.
In state 1, the regression coefficient is positive and insignificant. State 2 corresponds to
periods of financial crisis (the US savings and loans crisis in the early 90s; the Asian
financial crisis, Russian default, and the bursting of the dot-com bubble from 1996 to
2002, and the recent financial crisis from late 2007); therefore, the shift in regime of the
variance premium (and of its predictive power) could be linked to a systematic disaster
or to a jump in the consumption share of pessimistic agents, as would be implied by the
simple model in Section 2.
4.3 Predictive regressions in the cross section
I next study the predictive power of market variance risk premia for cap-based portfolio
excess returns, estimating regressions of the form
rei,t+h = αi + βi V RPt + εt+h, (45)
where rei,t+h denotes the monthly excess returns on portfolio i with horizon h. Table 7
reports results for portfolios including deciles 1 and 2 (large-cap CRSP index), 3 to 5
(mid-cap CRSP index), and 6 to 10 (small-cap CRSP index). At the one-month horizon,
there does not seem to be a clear pattern and overall significance is quite weak. At
longer horizons, the predictive power of the market variance risk premium for excess
returns is much stronger for small stocks, in line with the model and with the empirical
evidence described previously. At the six-month horizon, for instance, adjusted R2 for the
small-cap portfolio is 10.17%—more than 50% larger than the 6.21% R2 for the big-cap
portfolio. The forecasting power with respect to small stocks is still impressive at the one-
year horizon, with an R2 of 9.67%. As a robustness check, I estimate the same regression
on the 25 Fama and French portfolios that are sorted by the firm characteristics of size
and book-to-market ratio (BM).34 Figure 10 plots estimates of V RP loadings (left panel)
and of adjusted R2 in percentage (right panel) from regression (45), at the six-month
34Data are obtained from Kenneth French’s website. The portfolios are the intersections of five port-
folios formed on size and five portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market equity. Breakpoints
are the NYSE market equity and BM quintiles. Size 1 corresponds to small stocks and BM 1 to growth
stocks.
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horizon, for the 25 Fama and French portfolios. Lines connect portfolios of different
book-to-market categories within each size category while focusing on the bottom and
upper quintiles, which correspond to small and big stocks, respectively. On average,
small stocks have larger (in absolute value) V RP loading and higher R2. This means
that exposure to aggregate variance risk could partially explain the size premium.35 The
predictive power of variance risk premium for future returns seems to be stronger also
for growth stocks. Within the simulated model, however, no distinction can be drawn
between size and value effects if assets have identically distributed cash flows.
As in the case of predictive regressions for the aggregate market, discussed in Sec-
tion 4.2, the regression model in Equation (45) likewise assumes a monotone and linear
structure. Therefore, also in the cross section I analyze the dependence of the linear
regression coefficient βi on the level of the variance risk premium and of the difference
in beliefs (focusing on the six-month horizon); results are consistent with those reported
in Section 4.2. In accordance with the model and just as for the aggregate predictive
regression, predictive power increases with the level of the difference in beliefs (see Table
8). Differences among the DB quantiles seem to be stronger for the small-cap portfolio.
Also, the difference between small- and big-cap beta is significant only in the state where
there is a large difference in beliefs. In other states, the V RP loading and the adjusted
R2 are similar for large and small stocks, and the big-cap portfolio beta is even higher (in
absolute value) than the beta for small stocks when disagreement is low. The last panel of
Table 8 reports results of regressing, on the aggregate variance risk premium, the return
of a portfolio that is long the small-cap index and short the big-cap index. The regression
coefficient is negative and strongly significant when disagreement is high, with an R2 of
more than 20%. Therefore, in these states a large (absolute) variance risk premium pre-
dicts a larger size premium, while the effect is not significant when difference in beliefs is
low. This finding is related to the work of Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), who show
a negative relation between the size premium and consumer confidence. In fact, the size
effect (of smaller firms having higher returns on average) seems to be concentrated in pe-
riods characterized by large disagreement, as shown in Table 9. It is natural for investors
35Bali and Zhou (2015) show that an asset pricing model in which both market risk and aggregate
variance risk premium are priced can explain the premia for industry, size, and value.
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to require higher returns on assets that are more sensitive to systematic disaster risk.
The economic intuition for this finding can be found in Jagannathan and Wang (1996),
who argue that firms more likely to exhibit financial distress (e.g., small firms) have mar-
ket betas that are more sensitive to changes in the business cycle. Investor sentiment,
or disagreement, is thus related to time variation in the expected returns of those firms
because these factors forecast future business conditions. However, this reasoning holds
only when the perceived systematic jump premium is high. The model suggests that the
systematic jump premium component could actually have a negative effect on the stock’s
excess returns if the consumption share of pessimists were low enough. Thus the size
premium could go in opposite directions depending on which agent type dominates the
market. This finding is consistent with some of the later empirical research on the size
effect, which suggests that the premium disappears in the 1980s.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies both theoretically and empirically how agent disagreement about the
likelihood of systematic disasters affects the equity and variance risk premia and the
relation between them, both for the market portfolio and in the cross section of stocks.
The starting point is a general equilibrium model with multiple trees and disagreement
about systematic rare event risk.
The main findings are the following. First, the equity (variance) risk premium of
an individual stock tends to increase (decrease) with its dividend share and with the
consumption share of the pessimistic agent. The variance risk premium can also switch
sign, mainly for small stocks, and it is time varying; it alternates phases of small and
smooth premia with periods in which the variance premium is larger (in absolute value)
and more volatile. Second, the index variance risk premium is largely due to a covariance
premium when assets are relatively evenly distributed or the number of stocks in the
economy is large. The model-implied correlation risk premium, as the variance risk
premium, is large (in absolute value) when pessimists hold a large fraction of the aggregate
endowment. Third, rare event risk implies a tight link between the equity and the variance
risk premia, both for the market and for the cross section of stock returns. This link
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however is state-dependent and varies with the asset’s dividend share and the agents’
consumption share. In particular, the relation is stronger when the consumption share
of the pessimist is larger, i.e., in bad states of the economy, and for small stocks. Fourth,
in the case of a large diversified economy only systematic risk is priced and the relation
between equity and variance risk premia is conditionally linear. Moreover, infinitely small
assets still earn a risk premium owing to the presence of systematic rare event risk.
I investigate empirically the main predictions and show that, as implied by the model,
the relation between the equity premium and the index variance premium is time varying
and systematically linked to the degree of risk sharing among disagreeing investors. In
particular, the predictive power of variance premium for future excess returns is stronger
in periods of large differences in investor beliefs. This relation holds especially for small
stocks, whose returns are more dependent on the compensation for systematic rare event
risk.
This work suggests several interesting lines of future research. On the theoretical
side, the model’s simplicity means that several extensions are possible. Examples in-
clude introducing a stochastic diffusion volatility of the dividend processes and allowing
for learning based on an exogenous signal about the state of the economy. I could also
introduce disagreement with regard to both the disaster intensity and the expected div-
idend growth in normal times. Given the link between volatility risk premia and option
surfaces, the option pricing implications of an heterogeneous rare disaster model are also
worth exploring.
On the empirical side, it would be natural to look for potential time variation and
nonlinearity in the relation between stock returns and correlation risk premia as I find
for the variance risk premium. It would also be worth investigating whether the same
nonlinear relationships are present in other markets for which a link between disagreement
or variance premia and excess returns has been documented, as for example the fixed
income market (Mueller, Vedolin, and Yen (2011) and Buraschi and Whelan (2011)) and
the foreign exchange market (Beber, Breedon, and Buraschi (2010)).
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A Tables and Figures
Table 1: Model parameters
Preferences δ = 0.04 γ = 4
Dividends µ = 2.5% σ = 5% k = −0.41
Intensities βA = 1% βB = 0.01% λ = 1%
ϕ = 0.142 σX = 0.05
Table 2: Simulated market variance risk premium
cA 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.9
mean V RP −4.70 −5.48 −6.76 −8.85 −12.74
(1.13) (1.33) (1.50) (1.52) (1.33)
std V RP 0.55 0.66 0.82 0.99 0.95
(0.27) (0.47) (0.65) (0.71) (0.42)
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Table 3: Market return predictability by variance risk premium (V RP ), from simulated
monthly data, at horizons h = 1, 6 and 12 months, for different values of the ini-
tial consumption share of the pessimistic agent, cA = 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9. The table
shows the average of the regression coefficient and adjusted R2 over all simulations,
with standard errors in parenthesis. Returns are in annualized percentage while V RP
is in monthly squared percentage.
cA = 0.1 cA = 0.5 cA = 0.9
Horizon (months) 1 6 12 1 6 12 1 6 12
V RP Coeff -0.51 -0.20 -0.19 -0.38 -0.24 -0.24 -0.35 -0.26 -0.25
(0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.12) (0.15) (0.14) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07)
Adj R2 (%) 2.15 4.04 7.56 3.15 10.12 18.34 4.26 14.32 23.97
(0.98) (3.29) (6.29) (1.54) (6.06) (10.94) (1.80) (7.69) (12.97)
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Table 4: Predictability of excess returns of small (Panels A and C) and big (Panels B and
D) stock by variance risk premium (V RP , Panels A and B) and by covariance risk
premium (CRP , Panels C and D), from simulated monthly data, at horizons h = 1, 6,
and 12 months, for different values of the initial consumption share of the pessimistic
agent, cA = 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9. The small (big) stock has an initial dividend share
of s = 0.1 (s = 0.9). The table shows the average of the regression coefficient and
adjusted R2 over all simulations, with standard errors in parenthesis. Returns are in
annualized percentage while V RP and CRP are in monthly squared percentage.
Panel A: Regression of small stock returns on V RP
cA = 0.1 cA = 0.5 cA = 0.9
Horizon (months) 1 6 12 1 6 12 1 6 12
V RP Coeff 0.41 0.04 -0.02 0.25 0.06 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.08
(0.38) (0.26) (0.25) (0.34) (0.24) (0.22) (0.21) (0.23) (0.23)
Adj R2 (%) 1.57 4.02 7.13 1.30 4.13 6.67 0.72 5.86 9.61
(1.58) (5.75) (9.43) (2.04) (6.62) (10.01) (1.32) (7.63) (12.84)
Panel B: Regression of big stock returns on V RP
cA = 0.1 cA = 0.5 cA = 0.9
Horizon (months) 1 6 12 1 6 12 1 6 12
V RP Coeff -0.54 -0.15 -0.14 -0.42 -0.24 -0.23 -0.37 -0.26 -0.25
(0.24) (0.20) (0.19) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07)
Adj R2 (%) 1.91 2.43 4.53 3.00 8.45 15.27 3.96 12.46 21.27
(1.06) (3.62) (5.02) (1.48) (5.77) (10.50) (1.74) (7.24) (12.48)
Panel C: Regression of small stock returns on CRP
cA = 0.1 cA = 0.5 cA = 0.9
Horizon (months) 1 6 12 1 6 12 1 6 12
CRP Coeff -0.38 -0.37 -0.36 -0.31 -0.32 -0.32 -0.32 -0.30 -0.28
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Adj R2 (%) 1.95 11.37 19.09 1.58 9.78 16.28 4.14 18.84 28.22
(0.96) (5.05) (8.16) (1.50) (7.27) (11.43) (2.79) (11.05) (15.34)
Panel D: Regression of big stock returns on CRP
cA = 0.1 cA = 0.5 cA = 0.9
Horizon (months) 1 6 12 1 6 12 1 6 12
CRP Coeff 0.14 0.14 0.13 -0.07 -0.04 -0.04 -0.18 -0.16 -0.15
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25) (0.19) (0.15) (0.14)
Adj R2 (%) 0.36 3.43 7.41 0.51 4.03 8.57 1.19 6.04 10.78
(0.82) (4.15) (8.15) (1.03) (5.67) (9.99) (1.39) (6.05) (10.90)
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Table 5: Survival. This table displays the share of consumption of the optimistic agent, cB, at
horizon T = 50, 100, and 500 years, obtained from 1,000 simulations starting from
cB = 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9.
cB T = 50 T = 100 T = 500
0.1 0.08 0.07 0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
0.5 0.44 0.38 0.14
(0.12) (0.15) (0.16)
0.9 0.86 0.81 0.44
(0.08) (0.13) (0.28)
Table 6: Market return predictability by variance risk premium. Data are monthly from Jan-
uary 1990 to December 2011.
Panel A: OLS
Horizon (months) 1 3 6 9 12
VRP Coeff -0.553 -0.555 -0.476 -0.342 -0.272
t-stat -2.048 -2.777 -3.705 -2.991 -2.702
Adj R2 (%) 1.88 5.99 7.75 5.74 4.63
Panel B: Robust regression
Horizon (months) 1 3 6 9 12
VRP Coeff -0.824 -0.649 -0.473 -0.353 -0.292
t-stat -4.021 -5.896 -5.338 -5.060 -4.860
Adj R2 (%) 1.71 6.16 8.11 6.10 4.98
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Table 7: Return predictability by variance risk premium for CRSP cap-based portfolios. Panel
A include regression estimates at the one-month horizon, Panel B is for the six-month
horizon and Panel C for the 12-month horizon.
Panel A: one-month horizon
Portfolio Big Cap Mid Cap Small Cap
VRP Coeff -0.527 -0.597 -0.630
t-stat -1.975 -2.075 -1.820
Adj R2 (%) 1.69 1.45 1.12
Panel B: six-month horizon
Portfolio Big Cap Mid Cap Small Cap
VRP Coeff -0.435 -0.573 -0.736
t-stat -3.335 -3.844 -3.720
Adj R2 (%) 6.21 8.19 10.17
Panel C: 12-month horizon
Portfolio Big Cap Mid Cap Small Cap
VRP Coeff -0.229 -0.354 -0.450
t-stat -2.310 -3.099 -3.237
Adj R2 (%) 2.86 7.28 9.67
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Table 8: Return predictability by variance risk premium for small-, mid-, and big-cap portfolios
from CRSP, at the 6-month horizon, for different levels of the difference in beliefs.
For comparison, the last two panel report results of the same predictive regression for
the S&P500 index return and for small- minus big-cap portfolio return, respectively.
Small DB Average DB Large DB
small-cap
VRP Coeff 0.06 -0.32 -1.37
Adj R2 (%) -1.36 2.87 21.26
Small DB Average DB Large DB
mid-cap
VRP Coeff 0.19 -0.29 -1.11
Adj R2 (%) -0.41 3.82 17.79
Small DB Average DB Large DB
big-cap
VRP Coeff -0.18 -0.29 -0.82
Adj R2 (%) -0.04 2.86 14.41
Small DB Average DB Large DB
S&P500
VRP Coeff -0.24 -0.31 -0.97
Adj R2 (%) 1.09 4.02 20.91
Small DB Average DB Large DB
small-big
VRP Coeff 0.17 0.11 -0.60
Adj R2 (%) -0.55 -0.35 21.42
Table 9: Mean and standard deviation of returns (in annualized percentage) for small- and big-
cap portfolios from CRSP, at the 6-month horizon, for different levels of the difference
in beliefs.
Small DB Average DB Large DB
small-cap
Mean (%) 5.40 18.17 11.37
Standard Deviation (%) 21.54 22.90 45.48
Small DB Average DB Large DB
big-cap
Mean (%) 7.94 14.53 2.04
Standard Deviation (%) 15.00 19.62 32.61
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Figure 1: Instantaneous equity premium of stock 1, under agent A’s beliefs, as a function of
the dividend share of asset 1, s1, when the consumption share of the pessimistic
agent is cA = 0.1 (left panel) or cA = 0.9 (right panel).
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Figure 2: Instantaneous variance risk premium of stock 1, under agent A’s beliefs, in monthly
squared percentage, as a function of the dividend share of asset 1, s1, for different
values of the consumption share of the pessimistic agent is cA. The second, third
and fourth panels show the decomposition of the individual variance risk premium
in its idiosyncratic and systematic jump components when the consumption share of
the pessimistic agent is cA = 0.1, cA = 0.5 and cA = 0.9, respectively.
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Figure 3: Instantaneous equity (upper panels, in percentage) and variance (lower panels, in
monthly squared percentage) risk premium of the market, under agent A’s beliefs, as
a function of the dividend share of asset 1, s1, and their decomposition in terms of
individual equity and variance premia, for different values of the consumption share
of the pessimistic agent is cA. The first and third panels use cA = 0.1, while the
second and the fourth are for cA = 0.9.
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Figure 4: Instantaneous conditional stock return correlation under the physical and risk-
neutral measure, and instantaneous correlation risk premium, in an economy with
N = 2 assets.Figure 6: Instantaneous conditional stock return correlation in an economy with N = 2 assets.
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Figure 7: Instantaneous conditional stock return correlation under the risk-neutral measure,
in an economy with N = 2 assets.
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Figure 8: Instantaneous correlation risk premium, in an economy with N = 2 assets.
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Figure 9: Standard OLS regression of simulated excess market returns at the six-month hori-
zon on the simulated lagged instantaneous variance risk premium, for di↵erent levels
of the initial share of consumption of the pessimistic agent, cA. Upper panel display
the distribution of simulated regression coe cients and lower panel of percentage
R2.
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Figure 5: Instantaneous equity premium (annualized and in percentage, first panel),systematic
jump premium (second panel) and index variance risk premium (in monthly terms
and squared percentage, third panel), under agent A’s beliefs, in the case of a large
symmetric economy, as a function of the consumption share of the pessimistic agent,
cA.
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Figure 6: Time series of variance risk premium, in monthly squared percentage, where the
physical expectation of the realized variance is computed from a projection of real-
ized variance on the value of the lagged squared VIX and on lagged realized variance.
Light gray shaded areas denote phases in which difference in beliefs, measured based
on the dispersion of one-year-ahead forecasts on real GDP growth from the BlueChip
Economic Indicator, is above average. Dark gray shaded areas denote NBER reces-
sions.
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Figure 7: Standard OLS regression of excess market returns at the six-month horizon on the
lagged variance risk premium, for different levels of the V RP . The first box plot
corresponds to small absolute values of the premium (V RP < q70%), the last to
large values (V RP > q30%) and the middle box plot to average values of the V RP .
Upper panel display the distribution of regression coefficients and lower panel of
percentage R2, both obtained applying a block bootstrap procedure.
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Figure 8: Kernel regression of standardized excess market returns at the six-month horizon,
in annualized percentage, on the lagged variance risk premium, in monthly squared
percentage. Single dots represent the data, while the solid line is an estimated kernel
regression using Nadaraya–Watson estimator with a Gaussian kernel.
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Figure 9: Predictive regressions of market 6-month excess returns on lagged variance risk pre-
mium on a rolling window of 50 months. Upper panel shows regression coefficient
estimates with 95% confidence bounds, while lower panel reports adjusted R2 in per-
centage. The dashed red line in the upper panel denotes the regression coefficient
estimated on the full sample.
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Figure 10: Standard OLS regression of excess returns of Fama and French portfolios at the six-
month horizon on the lagged market variance risk premium. Left panel displays the
regression coefficients and right panel the percentage R2. Lines connect portfolios
of different book-to-market categories within each size category, focusing on the
bottom and upper quintiles, which correspond to small and big stocks, respectively.
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